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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers an alternative to the conventional explanation of the 2007-08 food price 
crisis in terms of escalating demand or dwindling supply. Instead, its focus is on the legal-
institutional structure of commodity futures markets, which has witnessed a drastic 
alteration in the role of  speculators. These have transformed from “market makers” (that 
keep commodity futures markets liquid by arbitraging on price fluctuations) to “market 
breakers”. Index speculation, in particular, has had the effect of muddling information 
about market “fundamentals” because of the need – brought about by commodity index 
swaps  –  for swap dealers to hedge the fluctuations of an index of commodity prices by 
opening and periodically rolling over long-only positions. This periodical rollover to comply 
with contractual obligations, rather than in response to anticipated fluctuations in the 
availability of a commodity in the future, can induce a “contango bias” in the commodity 
futures market that, in turn, might have given the wrong signals to market operators, 
leading to a condition of induced (rather than pre-existing) scarcity and to an increase in 
spot prices in the 2007-08 crisis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Starting at the end of 2007, commodity markets witnessed an increase in the prices of 
major food commodities. These included both staple grains like rice, wheat and maize 
(Ghosh 2010b), but also cash crops like coffee (Kerckhoffs, van Os, and Vander Stichele 
2010, 7). They peaked during 2008, generating waves of hunger in countries where a 
sizeable fraction of people’s incomes is spent on food (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2009, 6), 
and subsequently petered out towards the end of that year. A similar rise in food prices 
has occurred from the end of 2011 (Ziegler 2011, 299 ff.), reaching worrying levels once 
again around the time of writing (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2012). 
The debate following the 2008 food price crisis has sparked wildly diverging opinions. 
On the one hand, a series of factors relating to the “economic fundamentals” of food 
production have been pointed at as possible culprits. Such factors include bad harvests 
and/or decreasing yields (e.g. due to soil depletion caused by increased fertilizer use), 
increasing competition between food crops and biofuel plantations, oil prices and 
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increased demand for livestock fodder (consisting of grains) as a consequence of 
increased meat consumption in countries like India and China (Clapp 2012, 130; Ghosh 
2010a, 72–73). While the role of market fundamentals cannot be ruled out as such, the 
exclusive focus on “external” forces in producing the food price shock can be criticized for 
turning a blind eye on the endogenous dynamics of financial contraction and expansion 
(De Schutter 2010, 3). This brief paper aims to shed light precisely on these dynamics, 
which have engendered, for example, a demand for heightened regulation of derivative 
commodity trading. 
In order to do so, the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I it looks at the origins of 
commodity futures markets, and at the role of arbitrageurs within such markets. Section II 
then introduces another type of speculation, seeking to hedge the fluctuations of a 
commodity index by taking long-only positions on commodity futures markets. Section III 
looks at a landmark wave of deregulation of derivative commodity trading which altered the 
composition and relative weight of different type of speculators after the year 2000. Finally, 
Section IV offers an alternative explanation for the 2007-08 food price hike, by looking at 
the role played precisely by index speculators in an unregulated OTC market after 2000, 
focusing, in particular, on the “contango bias” that the systematic rollover of long-only 
positions might have induced in commodity futures markets.  
 
I. HEDGERS AND ARBITRAGEURS 
Commodity markets are simply spaces where deliverable goods are traded; as such, 
commodities are a category extending beyond agricultural products, including also oil and 
gas (Kerckhoffs, van Os, and Vander Stichele 2010, 2). Although physical delivery forms 
part of the definition of a commodity, this does not mean that the only allowed commodity 
trades are those for immediate delivery (also known as “spot” trading). In fact, it is 
precisely out of the need to shelter one’s supplies or sales from the fluctuations of “spot” 
prices that derivative instruments made their appearance in the world of commodities. So, 
for example, a company producing bread might be willing to purchase today, at a set price, 
a certain amount of grain for future delivery. The contract by which this result would be 
obtained is called a forward. The benefit of this operation would be that the company could 
“lock in” the cost of its anticipated demand for a raw material it knows it will need in the 
future (Robbins 2003, 167–168). Similarly, a grain producer might want to undertake an 
obligation to deliver a certain amount of his/her production at a future date for a set price, 
so as to stabilize his/her income flow and have some figures on which to base a calculus 
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of future production. Initially, such contracts would be made on an ad hoc basis, meaning 
that their precise content would be determined according to the needs of the parties. As 
the volume of traded commodities rose during the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Peck 1985, 4–7), however, the need to allow bulk trading on exchanges featuring many 
different participants brought with it a tendency towards the standardization of derivative 
contracts, which pre-specified the type of commodity as well as the delivery date (Kaufman 
2010, 30). These standardized contracts allowing to buy and sell commodities for future 
delivery are called futures (De Schutter 2010, 9). 
In traditional markets for commodity futures, two main types of actors would typically be 
seen at work: hedgers and arbitrageurs. Hedgers would be those operators trading in 
derivatives to protect themselves against future price fluctuations for business needs. This 
is where the bread-making company and the grain manufacturer of the earlier example 
would fit. Next to them, one would find arbitrageurs (or “traditional” speculators). These 
would not be interested in the physical delivery of the commodity at a future date. 
Therefore, they would act on the market by undertaking commitments that would cancel 
each other out (Kaufman 2010, 30). So, for example, one could commit to future purchase 
of grain at, say, $100, and then make a profit by exploiting subsequent price fluctuations 
that allowed to undertake a future sale at, say, $105; this buy-and-sell strategy that profits 
from increased prices is called going long (Garner 2010, 25). Alternatively, a traditional 
speculator might sell before buying. This is possible because futures contracts simply 
entail an obligation to buy and sell at a future date, and do not require ownership of the 
physical asset (so long as one does not hold them until delivery comes due) (Garner 2010, 
26). Hence, an arbitrageur can promise to sell grain at a future date (at a time when 
he/she expects the trading price to be higher than it would be, were he/she to undertake 
the same commitment at a later time, when the delivery date is closer) and then promise to 
buy it closer to delivery date when trading price has gone down. In the end, the two 
obligations cancel out and all the arbitrageur is left with is the profit from selling high and 
buying low—a strategy called going short (Garner 2010, 25). In order for one to be 
successful in this type of arbitrage, possessing information on the underlying supply 
dynamics of the commodity would be key (Masters and White 2008, 2). Furthermore, the 
presence of arbitrageurs on the commodity futures market would create an ongoing 
stream of participants willing to buy and sell futures, thereby guaranteeing the possibility 
for hedgers to find a counterparty with ease (Kaufman 2010, 30). 
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II. INDEX SPECULATORS 
The progressive deregulation of derivative commodity markets gradually enlarged the 
camp of participants uninterested in taking delivery of physical commodities, well beyond 
traditional arbitrageurs. Whereas the number and size of speculators was originally 
constrained by regulatory limits on the amount of contracts they could hold, the situation 
changed during the 1990s. At that time, in fact, some actors obtained significant 
exemptions from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the regulatory body 
entrusted with supervision of commodity futures exchanges), allowing them to increase 
their position on the market (Bjerga 2011; Kaufman 2010, 31). Among such actors were 
merchant banks like Goldman Sachs, which enacted a revolutionary scheme that would 
prove to be one of the main contributing factors to the food price shock of the late 2000s. 
In the early 1990s, in fact, Goldman Sachs came up with the idea of creating a 
commodity index fund. A commodity index is simply a mathematical formula in which the 
prices of different commodities are factored in according to different weights (Kerckhoffs, 
van Os, and Vander Stichele 2010, 5). As a consequence, the value of the index can be 
thought of as the price of a basket of commodities, held in different proportions. 
Furthermore, under the assumption that the prices of futures reflect—at maturity—prices 
experienced on the spot market, indexes typically take as reference the price of the 
nearest-expiring futures contract (Masters and White 2008, 8). Assuming futures prices 
later transfer over to the spot market, then the index can still be said to track commodity 
prices movements over time (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 8). 
This remark leads to the basic idea behind a commodity index fund, which is to replicate 
ownership of a basket of commodities so that “an investor theoretically experiences the 
same [financial] consequences as one who would have owned the corresponding 
commodities over the period of investment, and then selling them at the end of the period” 
(Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 9). The way this is done is through a “swap” contract. A swap 
is simply a contract whereby two parties agree to exchange cash flows (De Schutter 2010, 
9). In a commodity index swap, an institutional investor like a pension fund agrees to pay 
the swap dealer (who is typically a merchant bank) the three-month Treasury bill rate, plus 
a management fee. In return, they will be credited with the changes in the value of the 
index over the agreed period of investment (Masters and White 2008, 9). Hence, the 
investment tracks variations in the price of a basket of different commodities, essentially 
mimicking ownership of those commodities. Since the bank is committed to delivering 
returns replicating “synthetic” ownership of a bundle of commodities, it is necessary for it to 
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balance this liability through an investment strategy that will match the index’s 
performance. Now, since the index is obtained by combining a basket of commodity 
futures prices, the “natural” hedging strategy for the bank is simply to hold futures in 
proportion to the index’s composition: any increments in the value of the index will be 
matched by increases in the value of the futures the bank holds in its portfolio. Directly 
holding positions that follow the index puts the bank in the condition to transfer any 
increases in the value of the index over the stipulated period to the institutional investor, in 
exchange for the three-month Treasury bill rate plus a management fee.  
A significant issue arises here. In fact, while the index is an ongoing investment, 
futures—by their very nature—expire at a certain date into the future (Frenk and Turbeville 
2011, 8). As a consequence, the bank will have to periodically “lengthen” its futures 
exposure to contracts with a later maturity date. The way it does this is by evening out the 
commitment to buy with a commitment to sell, thereby offsetting its exposure to futures 
nearing maturity. Furthermore, it will also open—on the “buy” side—new positions with a 
later maturity date (Garner 2010, 28). The need periodically to “roll over” expiring 
commitments into others with later maturity dates arises purely from the bank’s contractual 
commitment to deliver returns on the index. Hence, it will carry out such task regardless of 
the underlying market conditions (Frenk and Masters 2010, 50). This, as shown later in 
this paper, has significant consequences.  
 
III. SPECULATION AFTER THE YEAR 2000 
Despite Goldman Sachs making index speculation available already in the early 1990s, it 
was only after year 2000 that this type of speculation gained momentum, to the point 
that—in 2008—about 40% of all open positions in the commodity futures market had come 
to be held by index speculators (Masters and White 2008, 34). The reason of this tidal 
change in the weight of index speculation is to be found in a landmark regulatory 
development occurred in the U.S. Indeed, 2000 is the year in which the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act was passed. To understand the import of the Act, it is first of all 
necessary to introduce the idea of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative. This is simply a 
derivative contract that is not standardized and cannot, therefore, be traded on an open 
exchange, but is instead stipulated by interested parties in an ad hoc fashion (Kerckhoffs, 
van Os, and Vander Stichele 2010, 4). The Commodity Futures Modernization Act allowed 
over-the-counter derivatives to trade in commodities, outside of the supervision of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC). In essence, this meant that OTC 
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derivatives could be entered into freely, without any need to disclose information to a 
regulatory body (Ghosh 2010a, 78). Furthermore, it became equally possible for parties 
uninterested in hedging for commercial purposes and only interested in speculation to 
enter into OTC commodity transactions (De Schutter 2010, 5). These changes opened the 
floodgates of commodity markets to institutional investors with large amounts of money to 
park. And their influence came to be felt precisely through the mainstreaming of OTC 
instruments like index swaps that, by enabling the business of commodity index funds, 
changed the face of speculation on commodity markets. Index speculation later took more 
refined forms, such as that of commodity exchange traded funds (ETFs). Unlike 
commodity index swaps, which are OTC derivatives negotiated bilaterally between a bank 
and an institutional investor, commodity ETFs issue shares that are traded on the stock 
exchange and make commodity investment accessible also to a retail clientele. From the 
point of view of their effect on the commodity market—which is discussed in the next 
section—they can however be considered equivalent to funds established through 
commodity index swaps (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 9). 
The liberalization of commodity speculation after the year 2000 also increased the 
range of speculators that would take both short and long positions in an attempt to 
arbitrage on price volatility, in much the same way as a “traditional” speculator would 
(Lines 2010, 14–15). However, unlike a traditional speculator, these “money managers”—
typically featuring hedge funds (United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
Secretariat 2011, 19)—would trade with little regard to the underlying economic 
fundamentals, and resort instead to econometric forecasting based on past values of a 
given commodity—to identify and exploit price trends in commodity markets, as well as in 
other asset markets (Staritz 2012, 13; Talbot 2002, 231–232). Because money managers 
actively manage a diversified portfolio, in which commodities feature alongside other 
assets, some of the positions they adopt on commodity markets are a consequence of 
events occurring in other exchanges: which explains recent findings that commodity prices 
have come to be increasingly correlated with each other, as well as with those of other 
types of asset (Windawi 2012, 16 & 20).  
The increased presence of speculators of the latter kind—who attempt to profit from 
market volatility—has also been described as a further side-effect of index speculation. 
Index speculation—as I explain further in the following section—induces price dynamics 
that are unrelated to market fundamentals. Consequently, futures markets are less able to 
function on information about economic fundamentals and this uncertainty translates into 
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increased volatility that, in turn, attracts participants like money managers, who are 
interested precisely in exploiting “price swings rather than fundamentals” (Frenk and 
Turbeville 2011, 30). 
 
IV. COMMODITY INDEX SPECULATION AND ESCALATING COMMODITY PRICES 
In the commodity futures market, the relation between the “spot” price (for immediate 
delivery) and the futures price is typically that the former will be greater than the latter 
(Kaufman 2010, 30). More generally, sales further into the future will be carried out for less 
than if they were carried out closer to the present. As a consequence, if one plotted the 
price for a particular commodity, say wheat, starting from the “spot” price, then moving 
onto the price of the nearest expiring future, then to the second-nearest expiring future, 
and so on, one would theoretically see such figures arranged along a downward-sloping 
curve, meaning that prices get lower as the maturity date is pushed further into the future. 
This condition is typically referred to as backwardation, and it reflects the basic nature of a 
futures contract as a form of insurance against future price fluctuations. In order to protect 
oneself from such fluctuations, a premium is paid in terms of a lower price than one would 
receive by trading on the spot market.  
There is, however, a second possibility. It can, in fact, happen that the price for future 
sale of a commodity exceeds that of a spot transaction. This situation is called contango. 
While, in theory, this should be an anomaly on commodities markets, it has actually been 
the norm during the 2008 world food price crises. As futures prices exceed spot prices, this 
may lead to a hoarding of supplies (to take advantage of future increases in price) and to a 
surge in demand (to take advantage of the lower current price), thereby exacerbating 
scarcity in the affected commodities and driving up also their spot price (Frenk and 
Turbeville 2011, 6). In other words, in a contango market, futures prices may drive up 
commodity prices in a kind of self-reinforcing loop (De Schutter 2010, 4). 
In relation to this phenomenon, Frenk and Turbeville (Frenk and Turbeville 2011) 
eloquently argue how commodity index speculation plays a decisive role in “nudging” 
commodity markets towards contango. At the same time, it sends all the wrong signals to 
actual suppliers and consumers of the commodity, with the chance of creating a situation 
of induced scarcity that—in the 2008 crisis—led to such hardship as to prompt the peoples 
of several countries to take to the streets. The way this comes about is precisely because 
of the need, for the banks that are party to a commodity swap deal, periodically to roll over 
expiring futures contracts into longer-dated ones.  
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When markets are in contango, this means that—on “roll time”—banks will offset their 
position in the near-dated future at a lower price than the cost of taking a position in a 
contract expiring later. In other words, they will lose money. However, the cost of this is not 
actually felt by the bank, but it is charged back to the original investor as a “management 
fee” (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 10). The cost of rolling over in a contango market detracts 
significantly from the returns investors may otherwise obtain from a commodity’s 
increasing price, as captured by the commodity index (Blas 2009). Despite this, increasing 
commodity prices have been a powerful lure for investors seeking an easy way to diversify 
their portfolio, especially following the dotcom and the housing price bubbles (Staritz 2012, 
11; Ghosh 2010a, 28). Furthermore, the passive nature of commodity index investment 
forgoes the need to appoint and monitor a dedicated trader, with the swap dealer-bank 
taking care of the periodic roll (Greer 2000, 46; Masters and White 2008, 9). 
Because index speculators routinely roll over their contracts at set times during each 
month, as well as because of the sheer turnover involved in this operation, it occurs that: 
(1) the nearest-expiring future becomes relatively underpriced during the roll period due to 
a surge in supply from index investors to offset their outstanding positions, whereas (2) the 
later-expiring future becomes relatively overpriced, again because of a surge in demand 
from index speculators. The simultaneous price depression of near-dated futures and 
inflation of far-dated ones is precisely what nudges commodity futures markets towards 
contango. This dynamic is further exacerbated by the trades that other speculators 
undertake in anticipation of the “Goldman roll.” This involves taking sell positions on the 
near-dated future before the roll period (at a higher price than would be available during 
such period) and buy positions on the far-dated future (at a lower price than during the roll 
period). When these positions are closed during the roll period, speculators manage to buy 
short-term for less and sell long-term for more than they originally spent during the pre-roll 
phase, thereby making a profit (Mou 2011, 6). The fact that a number of speculators all 
engage in the same activity in anticipation of the roll, however, also acts as a mechanism 
that further depresses near-dated futures and inflates later-dated ones (Frenk and 
Turbeville 2011, 13), thereby nudging the market towards contango and rising commodity 
prices even more, so as to make this kind of speculation a positive feedback force 
(Bradford De Long et al. 1990, 394) that compounds the contango bias already induced by 
index rolls. Finally, as commodity prices keep rising, more financial operators are attracted 
to commodity markets. As new money pours in, the size of long-only positions by index 
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speculators increases, so that the market’s bias towards contango and rising prices is 
further amplified (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 17; De Schutter 2010, 4). 
The contango bias of commodity markets as a result of index speculation ultimately 
makes the possibility of de-coupling investment in commodities from externalities in the 
real world just a fiction. Some scholars have argued that it is logically impossible for 
investment in derivative instruments to cause a rise in commodity prices, starting from the 
assumption that these may only rise if physical commodities are actually hoarded and 
scarcity is artificially increased on the market (Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 2009, 379–380). 
However, the effect of commodity index speculation is to make the price rise precede the 
hoarding of commodities by participants with access to physical storage facilities (rather 
than the hoarding preceding the price hike), who will hoard supplies precisely in response 
to the distorted price signal (rather than the other way around) (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 
9). 
This is further exacerbated by uncertainty about the part played by index speculators at 
any given time, as only the latter have details on the specific size of the futures positions 
they will roll (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 11). It is therefore difficult to know whether a price 
change is the result of speculation or of changes in the economic fundamentals. When 
price information becomes muddled, it is therefore possible that it affect the behavior of 
economic operators, even when movements are purely speculative (Frenk and Turbeville 
2011, 29; Frenk and Masters 2010, 30). It does not help that part of the toolkit of market 
operators and observers includes neoclassical models that systematically impute changes 
in price to economic fundamentals, thereby exacerbating the tendency of operators to act 
based on prices, as if the latter always conveyed information about the relative scarcity of 
a particular commodity (Frenk and Turbeville 2011, 29; Frenk and Masters 2010, 44). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have attempted to offer an alternative to the conventional explanation of the 
2007-08 food price crisis in terms of escalating demand or dwindling supply. Instead, my 
focus has been on the legal-institutional structure of commodity futures markets, which has 
witnessed a drastic alteration in the role of  speculators. These have transformed from 
“market makers” (that keep commodity futures markets liquid by arbitraging on price 
fluctuations) to “market breakers”. Index speculation, in particular, has had the effect of 
muddling information about the anticipated scarcity of a given commodity because of the 
need – brought about by commodity index swaps  –  to hedge the fluctuations of an index 
10 
 
of commodity prices by opening and periodically rolling over long-only positions. This 
periodical rollover to comply with contractual obligations, rather than in response to 
anticipated fluctuations in the availability of a commodity in the future, can induce a 
“contango bias” in the commodity futures market that, in turn, might have given the wrong 
signals to market operators with access to storage facilities, leading to a situation of 
induced scarcity and increased spot prices in the 2007-08 crisis. 
If this interpretation is correct, then it could be argued that the dynamics affecting the 
markets for agricultural commodities since the year 2000 display a high degree of the self-
referentiality, in the sense that price movements feed into each other with little weight 
given to information about economic fundamentals. When these dynamics are translated 
into the world of “real” economic variables, however, the effects are often deeply 
destabilizing, as lucidly exemplified by the 2008 world food price crisis. More generally, the 
volatility of markets for agricultural commodities has been sending—on a day-to-day 
basis—systematically wrong signals to producers, causing over-sowing or under-
cultivation (Ghosh 2010a, 79). Finally, whereas higher commodity prices have trickled 
down to consumer markets, the hike of 2008 has not been followed by a symmetrical 
decrease (as it occurred on international commodity markets). Higher prices have “stuck,” 
especially in countries without adequate structures in place to guarantee domestic food 
sufficiency and whose currencies have suffered depreciation vis-à-vis the dollar, thereby 
making it possible for prices of dollar-denominated imports to stay high even after the 
decline in global food prices after 2008 (Ghosh 2010a, 81).  
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